Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 32
Issue 2 March 1999

Article 5

1999

Where's the Beef? Mad Cows and the Blight of the SPS Agreement
Ryan D. Thomas

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Ryan D. Thomas, Where's the Beef? Mad Cows and the Blight of the SPS Agreement, 32 Vanderbilt Law
Review 487 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol32/iss2/5

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Where's the Beef?. Mad Cows and the
Blight of the SPS Agreement

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
Ii.
III.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................
THE SPS AGREEMENT ..............................................
THE BEGINNINGS OF THE "COMMON LAW": THE
RESOLUTION OF THE HORMONES DISPUTE ...................

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.

487
492
496

The Role of the PrecautionaryPrindple.........
496
Risk Assessment Under the SPS
Agreement ...................................................
501
Social Policy and Risk Management Under
the SPS Agreement .......................................
503
When is an SPS Measure 'Based On" a
Risk Assessment?........................................
505
When is an SPS Measure "BasedOn"
an InternationalStandard?...........................
507

IV.

THE EU'S BAN ON "SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS"...........

510

V.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................

514

I.

INTRODUCTION

The policies of a nation are seldom as susceptible to criticism
from other nations as those policies that attempt to regulate
international commerce. Indeed, even the internal regulations of
one country can often have pervasive effects well beyond its own
borders. In the wake of the "Mad Cow" scare, the European Union
(EU) proposed a ban on any use of animal remains believed to
have a specific risk of harboring Bovine Spongiform
Encephalopathy (hereinafter BSE),' which will become effective

1.
Specifically, the head and spine of cattle, sheep, and goats over twelve
months old and the spleen of all sheep and goats. See EU BSE Moves Threat to
$100M US Tallow Exports, MARKETLETTER, Aug. 18, 1997, available in 1997 WL
11871062.
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January 1, 2000.2 This ban is justified by the EU as prudent in
3
response to public health needs.
The ban is absolute and extends to foreign imports which
contain any materials at high risk of carrying BSE.4 One such
use of the animal remains is the production of tallow, or animal

fat, by boiling whole animal carcasses. 5

This is a common

practice in U.S. slaughterhouses which claim the ban is unfair
6
because it forces them to change their production methods,
particularly since there is no conclusive evidence that BSE exists
in the domestic U.S. cattle market from which these producers

draw their supplies. 7 Tallow derivatives are used in an estimated
eighty percent of pharmaceuticals and in cosmetics and
lubricants. 8 Additionally, the ban reaches cattle byproducts such
as gelatin and gelatin-based cosmetics. 9 Collectively, this ban
potentially affects up to $4.5 billion in U.S. pharmaceuticals
exports which use tallow derivatives as key ingredients.10

The United States has threatened to submit a complaint to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) if it is not exempted from the
ban." The ban is questionable under the GATT Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Standards Agreement from the Uruguay Rounds

2.
The ban, set for January 1, 1999, was recently delayed one year by EU
ministers amid concerns of the impact on the pharmaceuticals and cosmetics
trade. See EU Delays Animal Parts Ban, AP Online, Dec. 15, 1998, available in
1998 WL 23511491. In fact, the ban has been delayed several times to date amid
similar concerns and pressures. See generally Curt Anderson, Stick to Scientific
Evidence in Trade Disputes, Glickman Urges Europe, COM. APPEAL, Jan. 8, 1998, at
B7, available in 1998 WL 3659179.
Recent studies have shown a link between BSE and brain disorders in
3.
humans. See, e.g., Coping with BSE, ECONOMIST, Mar. 14, 1998, at-15.
4.
See Neil Buckley, Talks on BSE Threat to Drugs, FIN. TIMES (London),
Sept. 9, 1997, at 8, availablein 1997 WL 11055529. These high risk materials are
labeled "specified risk materials" (hereinafter SRMs). See EC Compromise on
Imports of US Made Gelatin, Chemical Business NewsBase, Dec. 23, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 16040885. SRMs are thought to possess contaminants
which may cause BSE which has been linked to Creutzfield-Jakob disease-the
human form of Mad Cow disease. See id.
5.
See Buckley, Talks on BSE, supranote 4, at 8.
See Neil Buckley, EU Urged to Exempt Drugsfrom BSE Rules, FIN. TIMES
6.
(London), Sept. 9, 1997, at 8, available in 1997 WL 11052281. It is likely the EU
would exempt tallow "prepared" according to EU standards and shown to be
similarly "BSE free," but the current U.S. practices are unacceptable to the EU
and the new ones are prohibitively expensive for U.S. producers to implement. Id.
See Anderson, supranote 2, at B7.
7.
8.
See Jonathan Stearns, EU to Reconsider Exemptions for U.S., Partners
on Meat Rules, WALL ST. J. EUR., Oct. 14, 1997, available in 1997 WL-WSJE
12213506.
9.
See Anderson, supranote 2, at B7.
10.
See E.U. Scientists Meet to ConsiderU.S. Tallow Ban Appeal, Dow Jones
Int"l News, Sept. 8, 1997, availablein WESTLAW, DJINSPLUS Database.

11.

See id.
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(SPS Agreement). 12 The SPS Agreement allows a WTO member to
choose the level of regulatory protectionism it wants to employ to
preserve "public health" and to protect the environment from
"risks arising from additives, contaminants, toxins or diseasecausing organisms in foods, beverages or feedstuffs." i8 However,
the Agreement established a framework within which the decision
is to be made. This framework specifically outlines the need for
"scientific" considerations to be made in the "risk assessment"
phase of the regulatory process when a measure, such as the
current EU proposal, is on the table.' 4 These considerations are
primarily to ensure that bona fide health regulations are passed,
not "protectionist" devices under the pretext of "public health."1 5
But the statute has been plagued by several interpretational
16
difficulties by the Member States.
The most glaring examples of these interpretational problems
have arisen in the hormone dispute 17 over a ban by the EC (now
the EU) of the administration of certain hormones (excepting
those for medical purposes) to cattle, and also the marketing and
slaughtering of cattle given the hormones, or selling or processing
the meat or meat products derived from such cattle.' 8 The United
States argued the hormones were "scientifically" proven safe if
used correctly and brought its complaint to the WTO for
resolution. 19 Both sides were split (among other things) as to: (1)
the meaning of "scientific justification," (2) what "based on"
international standards means when choosing a level of
protection, (3) the role of the Precautionary Principle, and (4) the

12.
See Michele D. Carter, Selling Science Under the SPS Agreement:
Accommodating Consumer Preference in the Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN.
J. GLOBAL TRADE 625, 625-26 (1997).
13.
Id. at 631-33.
14.
Id. at 633.

15.

Id. at 633-34.

16.

See WTO Secretariat, EC Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat Products

(Hormones), Complaint by Canada, Report of the Panel, WT/DS48/R/CAN Parts
III-IV (Aug. 18, 1997), available at <http://www.wto.org/wto/ddf/ep/public.htm>
[hereinafter Canada Panel Report].

17.
This dispute arguably was the impetus for the adoption of the SPS
Agreement. The Agreement was viewed as a mechanism for resolving such
international trade disputes and evading damaging trade wars that often adversely
affect the world economy. See infra notes 37-43 and accompanying text. See also
<http://www.wto.org/wto/goods/spsund.htm>.
18.
See John R. Schmertz and Mike Meier, WTO Panel Decision Holds that
European Communities" Ban on Meat from Animals Treated with Growth Hormones
Violated InternationalTrading Rules, 3 INT"L. L. UPDATE, 120, 121 (1997), available
in WESTLAW, TP-ALL Database.
19.
See id. at 121.
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precise contours of a "risk assessment" in the context of the SPS
20
Agreement.
For better or for worse, the recent resolution (and appellate
decision) of the Beef Hormones Dispute by WTO dispute
resolution panels shed some much needed light on a statutory
text wrought with ambiguities. The decisions are likely to greatly
influence the outcome of the SRM dispute should the United
States formally go before the WTO. Since this is the first case
interpreting the SPS Agreement, the decision is the first step in
"common law"
the development of what will inevitably become2 the
1
of science in the realm of world trade disputes.

Unfortunately, the decisions are likely more harmful than
beneficial to the necessary goal of harmonizing the needs of
international trade and public health and welfare. First, the
decision announced a limited applicability of the Precautionary
Principle under the Agreement even though the Precautionary
Principle is not yet an accepted norm of international law. 2 2 The
dispute resolution panel also emphasized that considerations
other than empirical science may be accounted for during risk
assessment. 23 The natural inference from this holding is that
social, political, and economic values outside of the realm of
24
science have a role under the Agreement.
These holdings seem to undermine the true purpose of the
statute-making science a more prevalent factor in international
trade regulation for public health. 25 As a result, as long as the
EU conforms to the Agreement's demands for risk assessmentdemands which now seemingly permit social influences as part of
the equation-the proposed ban may be acceptable regardless of
any political or social motivations behind it.
While social influences and public anxiety are, by their
nature, a necessary element of any public policy consideration,
more neutral influences such as science should be more heavily
weighted where the ramifications of the regulation extend beyond
the borders of that particular country. This is not only to protect
the needs of the world economy in efficient international trade,

20.
See generallyWTO Secretariat, EC Measures ConcerningMeat and Meat
Products (Hormones), Complaint by the United States, Report of the Panel,
WT/DS26/R/USA (Aug. 18, 1997), available at <http://www.wto.org/
wto/ddf/ep/public.htm> [hereinafter U.S. Panel Report].
21.
See Jeffrey Atik, Science and InternationalRegulatory Convergence, 17
NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 736, 755 (1997) (discussing the potential impact of panel
decisions on the regulatory decisions of the WTO Members).
22.
See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
23.
See infra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
24.
Indeed, it is likely that such considerations may underlie the holdings
of the panels themselves.
25.
See Atik, supra note 21, at 740.
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but also to protect the interests of those foreign, yet similarly
affected, peoples to whom the state owes no political
accountability. Thus, a country should be limited in the range of
discretion it has to choose the "level of protection" it deems
necessary, as under the SPS agreement, in order to protect public
health by the regulation of drugs and foodstuffs. Placing
restrictions on the global market is not the proper means for

regaining "consumer confidence" (a stated goal of the EC in
proposing the ban 26 ) in what is largely an intrastate issue.
Accordingly, and opposed to the view of the appellate panel,
the WTO should demand adherence to acceptable international
regulatory standards, thereby giving every nation a voice in the
approval of the ban. If a Member is unhappy with the
international standards it can lobby the other Members to
conform their views to its own, thereby utilizing the inherent
structural protections of the WTO. Furthermore, Members will
find it in their best interests to treat other Members fairly, and
they would not likely want to establish unfavorable precedents
that could ultimately work against them.
Demanding adherence to the international standards will
also help ensure uniformity 2 7 by inhibiting the opportunity for a
country to adversely effect international trade, whether
consciously or unconsciously, by establishing trade regulations
which, in light of the international standards, are neither
necessary nor proper in relation to the actual threat posed.
Finally, the Agreement's strong emphasis on eliminating
"protectionism" tends to overshadow the fact that there are other
evils, with potentially more egregious effects, that may arise from
giving countries too much discretion in risk management. As with
the proposed tallow ban, a Member State's regulation, even with
presumably proper2" motives, can harmfully effect international
trade while still adhering to the form of the current SPS
29
Agreement.

This Note will first outline the SPS Agreement itselfspecifically, Part II attempts to present the relevant articles in a
manner providing the necessary background for understanding
the WTO dispute panel and Appellate Body decisions. Next, Part

26.
Tara Parker-Pope & Julie Wolf, EUAgrees to Ban Exports of British Beef,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1996, at A14 (quoting EU Agriculture Commissioner Franz
Fischler on the need for the ban to bolster confidence in the beef market). While
this was before the proposal to ban imports, it clearly shows the initial impetus for
action.
27.
Uniformity is a primary goal of modem trade accords.
28.
"Proper" means that there are no protectionist motives.
29.
As the Agreement is apparently understood by the WTO Appellate Body
for the Hormone Dispute.
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III discuss and critique, the dispute panel and Appellate Body
decisions, specifically, noting the shortcomings of these decisions
in the context of the SPS Agreement and its utility as a precedent
of international dispute resolution in the area of international
regulation of drugs and feedstuffs. Next, I will addresses the
likely effect of these decisions upon a possible WTO resolution of
the SRM dispute (should it proceed that far). Finally, Part V
offers conclusions and recommendations to help guide future
decisions to be more pragmatic and to better promote the goals of
the SPS Agreement.

II. THE SPS AGREEMENT
The Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards (SPS) Agreement
of the Uruguay Round augments the content of GATT Article
XX(b) and (g) relating to "measures affecting, plant, animal, and
human life or health" and the environment.3 0 Prior to the SPS
Agreement, GATT scrutiny of discriminatory regulations under
the guise of public health was far less rigorous. 3 l The SPS
Agreement was intended to make "science" a more prevalent
factor in the affected areas because of the potential for
"protectionist" regulatory devices under the guise of "public
health" or "safety".3 2 Indeed, as one commentator has noted, "the
presence and integrity of scientific support is a principal
touchstone for determining the legitimacy of many national
public health."3 3
regulatory efforts aimed at assuring . .
Additionally, the Agreement was intended to aid developing
countries which may have economic or political difficulties 3 in
4
complying with SPS measures of other more developed nations.
The preamble sets forth several goals of the Agreement.
Specifically, the Agreement encourages the adoption of those

30.
Carter, supra note 12, at 630 (citing General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-3, 55 U.N.T.S. 188).
See Julie Cromer, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures: What They
31.
Could Mean for Health and Safety Regulations Under GATT, 36 HARV. INT"L L.J.
557, 558 (1995).
See Carter, supra note 12, at 630-31. More specifically, the agreement
32.
prohibits measures 'which would constitute a disguised restriction on
international trade." GATT Secretariat, Agreement on the Application of Sanitary
and PhytosanitaryMeasures, MTN/FA II-AIA-4, art. 2.3 (Dec. 15, 1993), auailable
at <http://www.wto.org/wto/goods/spsagr.htm> [hereinafter SPS Agreement].
David Wirth, The Role of Science in the Uruguay Round and NAFTA
33.
Trade Disciplines,27 CORNELL INTL L.J. 817, 818 (1994).
See SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at pmbl.
34.
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regulations necessary to protect human health.3 5 Furthermore,
the Agreement promotes harmonization of sanitary and
phytosanitary
measures between
Members
based upon
internationally accepted norms, but qualifies this by noting that
Members should maintain discretion to set their own appropriate
levels of SPS protection.3 6 Finally, the Agreement seeks to
eliminate SPS measures which would result in a 'disguised
37
restriction on international trade."
Article 2 sets out the basic rights and obligations of the
Members.3 8 Article 2 gives Members the ability "to take sanitary
and phytosanitary measures necessary for the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health" that are likewise consistent
with the rest of the SPS Agreement.3 9 A Member's SPS measures
must be uniformly applied and may not arbitrarily discriminate
between Members where similar conditions exist.4 ° In other

words, protectionism is not a permissible justification for an SPS
measure. 4 1 The Agreement mandates that an SPS measure is to
be "applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not

maintained without sufficient scientific evidence."4 2 Additionally,
these measures may not be applied in a manner "which
would
43

constitute a disguised restriction on international trade."
The SPS Agreement also gives Members a powerful
discretionary device in the "risk management" or public policy

35.
Id. However, the Agreement does little to define what is necessary to
protect human health in this context. This will become relevant in the ultimate
task of risk management. The Agreement avoids adopting a particular cost, benefit
or risk management methodology. For example, how much weight should be
accorded economic injury to other Members where a measure's benefit is slim, but
arguably necessary to protect a human life? In other words, is it appropriate to
regulate in a discriminatory manner if only one life in a million will be protected
by the regulation? One in ten million? These unresolved issues leave considerable
discretion with the Members in setting their own levels of SPS protection.
36.
Id. The Agreement specifically alludes to recommendations of relevant
international organizations for guidance in this task, including the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the
'international and regional organizations operating within the framework of the
International Plant Protection Convention." Id.
37.
Id.
38.
See generally id. at art. 2.
39.
Id. at art. 2.1. The Agreement specifically defines an SPS measure as
one applied "to protect animal or plant life or health ...
from risks arising from
the entry, establishment or spread of pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms
or disease-causing organisms." Id. at Annex A, para. 1(a).
40.
See id. at art 2.3.
41.
See id.
42.
Id. at art. 2.2.
43.
Id. at art. 2.3.
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application of the Agreement." A Member has a duty under
Article 3 to harmonize its SPS measures with international
recommendations or guidelines. 45 While a Member is encouraged
to base its measures on internationally accepted standards, 4 6 a
Member may nonetheless impose measures more stringent than
those applied by current international standards where such
measures have "scientific justification."4 7 The Agreement
specifically defines "scientific justification" as existing if "on the
basis of an examination and evaluation of available scientific
information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this
Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international
standards, guidelines or recommendations are not sufficient to
achieve its appropriate level of [protection]." 48 Those measures
which do conform to international guidelines are presumptively

valid. 4 9
Furthermore,
Members are permitted,
during "risk
assessment," to choose their own "acceptable level of risk" when
adopting health related measures.5 0 More specifically, that level
of risk should be "[tlhe level of protection deemed appropriate by
the Member establishing a sanitary or phytosanitary measure to

protect human, animal or plant life or health within its
territory."5 1
However, each member must additionally consider "the

objective of minimizing negative trade effects."5 2 To this end, the
Agreement

states

that "Members

shall

ensure

that

such

measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve
their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection,
taking into account technical and economic feasibility." S 3 "[A]

44.
While the term "risk management" is not express in the Agreement, its
import is nonetheless assumed for any rational application of an accord which
regulates public policy. See Wirth, supranote 33, at 837.
45.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 3.1. The extent of this duty
and what it means to "base" an SPS measure upon international norms is
currently a subject of intense debate. See discussion infra Part III.E.
46.
See SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at art. 3. 1.
47.
Id. at art. 3.3. This measure seems to controvert the goal of
harmonization.
48.
Id. at art 3.3 n.2.
49.
See id. at art. 3.2.
50.
See id. at Annex A, para. 5. But the SPS Agreement asserts that
Member assessments should "takfe] into account risk assessment techniques
developed by the relevant international organizations." Id at art. 5.1 (emphasis
added).
51.
Id. at Annex A, para. 5.
52.
Id. at art. 5.4. In doing so Members are required to assess relevant
economic effects of the entry or establishment of a disease, its control costs and
"the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches" to minimizing the risks
of the entry or establishment of such diseases. Id. at art. 5.3.
53.
Id. at art. 5.6.
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measure is not more trade restrictive than required unless there
is another measure, reasonably available taking into account
technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the appropriate
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is significantly
less restrictive to trade."54 Additionally, where scientific evidence
is unclear, "a [member may provisionally adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent
information."5 5 However, in such circumstances the Members
must try to gather additional scientific evidence to perform a
more accurate risk assessment.5 6 Additionally, the Member must
review the SPS measure within a reasonable period to assure its
s7
effectiveness and continued necessity.
Finally, a Member must base its SPS measure upon a risk
assessment under Article 5. s Such assessment must consider
the risks to human or animal life or health and take into account
relevant risk assessment techniques promulgated by the
appropriate international organizations. 5 9 The risk assessment
must also take into account all relevant scientific evidenceincluding relevant processes and production methods, and
sampling and testing methods. 6 0 Additionally, Members must
consider "the exceptional character of human health risks to

which people voluntarily expose themselves."6 '
While a step in the right direction, the Agreement is
ambiguous on its face about several pertinent issues related to
the effective enforcement and interpretation of the Agreement. For
instance, what is a "substantially" less trade restrictive measure?
What does it mean to "base" a measure on international
standards?
Is the Precautionary Principle a "relevant
international standard" upon which to base a decision as to the
"acceptable level of risk" of a particular member? Should an
economic cost/benefit paradigm, as to the probability and
magnitude of the threat posed, be considered in the risk
assessment? Does risk management in the context of the
Agreement require adherence to the findings of the risk
assessment? As is usually the case in statutory interpretation,
many such inevitable ambiguities will likely be resolved by the

54.
55.
Principle.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id at art 5.6 n.3.
Id. at art. 5.7. This provision seemingly adopts the Precautionary
See id.
See id
See id. at art. 5.1.
See id
See id. at art. 5.2.
Id. at art. 5.5.

496

VANDERBILT JOURNJAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:487

judiciary, or, as here, by the eventual body of WTO dispute
resolution opinions.

III. THE BEGINNINGS OF THE "COMMON LAW":
THE RESOLUTION OF THE HORMONES DISPUTE
The decision of the dispute resolution panel of the WTO
regarding the Hormones Dispute and the subsequent appellate
decision, while unsatisfying in several regards, 6 2 offer the first
explanation of some of the troubling ambiguities in the SPS
Agreement and likely set precedent for future decisions.
A. The Role of the PrecautionaryPrinciple
The use of the Precautionary Principle 63 in the regulatory
process is gaining acceptance on the international level where

countries face risk assessment decisions

in the face of

substantial scientific uncertainties or where public health is
potentially implicated. 64 The Precautionary Principle "counsels
governmental authorities to err on the side of environmental [or
public health] protection in formulating public policy in contexts
characterized by conditions of scientific uncertainty."65 The EU's
precautionary approach during the Hormone Dispute specifically
promoted "the attainment of a high level of consumer protection
before the commercial interests of farmers and pharmaceutical
companies."66 Those who support the Precautionary Principle
tend to endorse precautionary measures in the face of any risk to
the environment or public health without further engaging in an
evaluation of the seriousness of the actual risk.67 Indeed, they
cite the difficulty of establishing scientific "certainty" on a

62.
See discussion infra Part V.
63.
Although this is called the Precautionary Principle, several authors
maintain that it should be the Precautionary "Approach" because there is not a
specific, uniform formation of the approach to merit labeling as a "principle"
per se. See, e.g., Carter, supranote 12, at 643-44; Wirth, supranote 33, at 838.
64.
See Wirth, supranote 33, at 838.
65.
Id.
66.
Carter, supra note 12, at 642 n. 122 (quoting EC Measures Concerning
Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), Submission of the European Community to
the Panel on European Community 124 (Sept. 20, 1996)).
67.
See, e.g., id. at 640-41 (stating that the EC's ban is based more on
precaution than on scientific evidence).

THE SPS AGREEMENT
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particular biological
health threat as justification for erring on the
68
side of caution.
Furthermore, this approach is seemingly endorsed by the
very terms of the SPS Agreement which permits Members to
69
choose their own level of sanitary or phytosanitary measures.
This right is "qualified" by the need for a "scientific
justification,"7 0 but the Agreement, in a footnote, defines
'scientific justification" as being based on "an examination and
evaluation of available scientific information." 7 1 This definition
seemingly endorses a precautionary approach as it does not
require "conclusive" scientific justification for a particular
measure, but only a risk assessment based upon current science.
Indeed, even what "science" means in the context of the
Agreement is a subject of debate. At least one author argues that
"science is not fixed," but rather is subject to opinion potentially
as varying as the geographic and cultural centers from which the
opinion could emanate. 7 2 Thus, because the Agreement does not
require a threshold of scientific certainty of any potential risk, but
rather only consideration of science, the Agreement seems to
support the adoption of a precautionary measure in the face of
any amount of risk.
Those who oppose the Precautionary Principle tend to focus
on the adverse implications of overly cautious regulation in the
absence of conclusive scientific evidence of the actual risk.7 3
These countries generally tend to endorse a "wait and see"
philosophy which endorses "scientific certainty as a precondition
to adopting policy responses."7 4 Furthermore, these countries
specifically reject the influence of "consumer anxieties rather
than any actual adverse effects on human health" when
conducting risk assessments of a particular health threat. 75
Thus, the adoption or acceptance of the Precautionary Principle,
in the context of the SPS Agreement, would allow for potentially
more trade-restrictive regulations than are necessary for the

68.
See Wirth, supra note 33, at 837-38 (stating that the precautionary
principle rejects the "wait and see" approach that emphasizes "a high degree of
scientific certainty as a precondition to adopting policy response").
69.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 3.3 (stating that Members
can choose higher measures than those recommended by relevant international
standards "if there is a scientific justification").

70.
71.

Id.
Id. at art. 3.3 n.2.

72.
See Atik, supranote 2 1, at 749.
73.
See Carter, supra note 12, at 638-39 (stating that restriction is based
on "consumer anxieties" rather than science and that "the ban is a disguised
restriction on international trade").
74.
Wirth, supranote 33, at 838.
75.
Carter, supranote 12, at 639.

498

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:487

protection of human health.7 6 This would defeat the stated goal of
the negative regulatory effects
the SPS Agreement of minimizing
77
on international trade.
The goals of protecting public health and minimizing the
adverse impact of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations on
international trade, within the context of the SPS Agreement, are
frequently contradictory in nature, and present a formidable
obstacle in the path of any attempt at harmonization.
In its resolution of the Hormones Dispute, the WTO dispute

resolution panel specifically held that the Precautionary Principle
"would not override the explicit wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 [of
the SPS Agreement]," but that the principle was, at the same
"
time, "incorporated and given a specific meaning in Article 5.7. 78
Article 5.1 maintains that "[miembers shall ensure that their
sanitary or phytosanitary measures are based on an assessment,
as appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human...
health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed
by the relevant international organizations." 79 Article 5.2
commands that "[iun the assessment of risks, Members shall take
into account available scientific evidence; relevant processes...
[and] relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods."8 0
Finally, Article 5.7 suggests that 'where relevant scientific
evidence is insufficient, a Member may provisionally adopt
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available
pertinent information, including that from the relevant
international organizations as well as from sanitary or
phytosanitary measures applied by other Members." 8 ' Article 5.7
additional
goes on to encourage Members to actively seek
82
measures for a more 'objective assessment of risk."
Thus, a finding by the Panel that a Member did not base its
sanitary or phytosanitary measure on a "risk assessment," in the
context of the SPS Agreement, cannot be overridden by the fact
that the member was adopting a Precautionary Approach in the

76.

See, e.g., id. (citing EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products

(Hormones), Submission by the United States 122 (Aug.28, 1996)).
77.
See SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at pmbl. (stating that measures

should not be "a disguised restriction on international trade").
78.

WTO Secretariat, EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products

(Hormones),Report of the Appellate Body WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R para.
120 (Jan. 16, 1998) (discussing the findings of the initial dispute panel)
[hereinafter Appellate Report].

79.

SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at art. 5.1.
80.
Id. at art. 5.2.
81.
Id. at art. 5.7.
Id. Presumably, this indicates that a Member may not be able to
82.
sustain an overly cautionary measure once more scientific evidence of the actual
risk is available.
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application of the measure.8 3 The basis of the Panel's holding is
that 'the principle has not been written into the SPS Agreement
as a ground for justifying SPS measures that are otherwise
inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in" the
Agreement. 8 4 Thus, to the extent a Member has an obligation to
perform a "risk assessment," a Member cannot bypass this

obligation in reliance on its own precautionary regulatory policy.
The EU submitted that the Precautionary Principle is, "a
general customary rule of international law" or "a general
principle of law" in accordance with the provisions of Article 5.2
of the Agreement."5 In relation to Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the
Agreement, the EU maintained that applying the Precautionary
Principle means that "it is not necessary for all scientists around
the world to agree on the "possibility and magnitude" of the risk,
nor for all or most of the WTO Members to perceive and evaluate
the risk in the same way."8 6 The EU argued that the Agreement
incorporates such an approach because it does not "prescribe a
particular type of risk assessment and [does] not prevent
Members from being cautious in their risk assessment
87
exercise."
On the contrary, the United States does not consider the
Precautionary Principle to be "customary international law" and
suggested that it is indeed more of an "approach" than a
"principle."8 8 However, the United States did recognize that the
Precautionary Approach is an "emerging principle of law" which
may someday be a "general principle[ ] of law recognized by
civilized nations."8 9
Unfortunately, the Dispute Resolution Panel (and the
Appellate Body)90 deftly was able to avoid making a definitive
finding on the issue by the mere technicality, as noted above, that
the EU failed to perform a "risk assessment" as obligated under

83.

See Appellate Report, supra note 78,

at para. 120 (citing U.S. Panel

Report, supra note 20, at para. 8.158).
84.
Id. at para. 124.
85.
Id. at para. 121 (citing EC's appellant's submission, para. 9 1).
86.
Id. (citing EC's appellant's submission, para. 88).
87.
Id. (citing EC's appellant's submission, para. 94).
88.
See id. at para. 122.
89.
Id. (citing United States" appellee's submission, para. 92). A cynical
view of this pundit would suggest, however, that this was merely a strategic "out"
the U.S. employed to enable it to credibly adopt the counter view should the tables
turn in a future dispute.
90.
The Appellate Body was a panel formed by the WTO to hear the appeals
from the Hormone Dispute resolution. See SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at 11
(providing that disputes shall be settled in accordance with the procedures
outlined in Articles XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(1994) and applied by the Dispute Settlement Understanding).
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the Agreement in Articles 5.1 and 5.2. 9 1 This sleight of hand
conveniently left the door open for a Member to once again defend
an SPS measure on the ground of the Precautionary Principle.
However, in what is arguably dicta, and in a subsequent
footnote, the Appellate Body seemed to indicate its view that the
Precautionary Principle was not yet an accepted principle of
"general" or "customary international law."9 2 Indeed, the
Appellate Body specifically noted that the "Precautionary
Principle, at least outside the field of international environmental
law, still awaits authoritative formulation." 93
Furthermore, the Panel likewise did not outline the precise

role of the Precautionary Principle in Article 5.7 because the EU

94
did not seek to defend the Hormones Ban under that provision.
However, the Appellate Body, in a finding that will undoubtedly
confuse the issue even more, confirmed that the Precautionary
Principle nonetheless "finds reflection in Article 5.7," and that
there was "no need to assume that Article 5.7 exhausts the
95
relevance of a precautionary principle."

91.
See Appellate Report, supranote 78, at paras. 123, 250.
92.
See Appellate Report, supra note 78, at para. 123 & n.92 (citing
authors who do not believe that the Precautionary Principle has yet reached the
status of a principle of international law).
93.
Id. at para. 123. The Appellate body specifically noted that the "status
of the precautionary principle in international law continues to be the subject of
debate among academics, law practitioners, regulators and judges." Id. at para.
123 n.92. The Appellate Report suggests J. Cameron, The Status of the
Precautionary Principle in International Law, in INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (J. Cameron and T. O"Riordan, eds. 1994); 1 P. SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1985) for a more intensive look at the status of
the Precautionary Principle in international law and the law generally. See id.
The Appellate Report asserts that these books suggest that while the
Precautionary Principle is still evolving, there is sufficient state practice to support
the view that it is a customary principle of international national law. See id. In
contrast the Appellate Report cites P. BIRNIE & A. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE ENVIRONMENT (1992); L. Gundling, The Status in International Law of the
PrecautionaryPrincle, 1,2,3 INT'L J. OF ESTUARINE AND COASTAL L. 25 (1990) for
arguments that due to a great variety of interpretations of the Principle, it has not
yet attained the status of a general principle of international law. See id.
Additionally, the Appellate Body noted that the International Court of Justice has
not yet recognized the precautionary principle as a new norm or standard in the
field of environmental protection. See id. at para. 123 n.93 (citing Case
Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 11114, (Sept. 25)).
94.
See id. at para. 120 (citing U.S. Panel Report, supra note 20, at para.
8.157).
95.
See id. at para. 124. Furthermore, the Appellate Body recognized that
the Precautionary Principle is reflected in the preamble and in Article 3.3, which
explicitly permit Members to establish their own appropriate level of sanitary
protection, which may be higher than implied existing international standards or
guidelines imply. See id.
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Additionally, specifically addressing the obligations of Articles
5.1 and 5.2, the Appellate Body held that a panel charged with
determining whether "sufficient scientific justification" exists to
set a level of sanitary protection more stringent than accepted
international norms should "bear in mind that responsible,
representative governments commonly act from perspectives of
prudence and precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. lifeterminating, damage to human health are concerned_" 96 This
statement impliedly concedes that the Precautionary Principle
may play a viable role in the "risk management" task associated
with the implementation of an SPS measure. 9 7 However, it
remains unclear what formulation of the Precautionary Principle
the Appellate Body is implicitly recognizing, because the
Appellate Body simultaneously maintains that there is no
authoritative formulation of the Precautionary Principle as a
general rule of law.98 This inconsistency will doubtlessly and
needlessly confuse a Member trying to conform to its obligations
under the Agreement.
B. Risk Assessment Under the SPS Agreement
The SPS Agreement specifically defines "risk assessment":
The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of
a pest or disease within the territory of an importing Member
according to the [SPS] measures which might be applied, and of the
associated potential biological and economic consequences; or the
evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on human or animal
health arising from the presence of additives, contaminants, toxins
or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs. 9 9

The Panel interpreted the above definition as a two-step process
that "should (i) identify the adverse effects on human health (if
any) arising from the presence of the hormones at issue when
used as growth promoters in meat or meat products .... and (ii)
if any such adverse effects exist, evaluate the potential or
probability of occurrence of these effects."10 0 Though specifically
addressing the Hormones Controversy, the conceptual framework
would clearly be applicable to any case where a substance and its
specified use are called into question in the application of an SPS
measure.

96.
Id.
97.
This assumes that a "risk assessment," as defined by the Agreement,
was undertaken prior to the policy implementation. See SPS Agreement, supra
note 32, at Annex A, para. 4 for the definition of "risk assessment."
98.
See Carter, supranote 12, at 641.
99.
SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at Annex A, para. 4.
100.
U.S. Panel Report, supra note 20, at para. 8.44 (emphasis omitted).
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While not explicitly rejecting the Panel's two pronged
analysis, the Appellate Body did object to the Panel's10use of
aprobability" as an alternative term for "potential." ' The
Appellate Body held that "[t]he ordinary meaning of "potential"
relates to "possibility" and is different from the ordinary meaning
of "probability"... [which] implies a higher degree or a threshold
of potentiality or possibility."10 2 The Appellate Body objected to
the introduction of a "quantitative dimension to the notion of
10 3
risk."
In the application of its "probability" standard, the Panel
made a subjective decision that a risk of harm to human health
of approximately one in a million is not a "scientifically identified
risk."' 0 4 Thus, the Panel implicitly held that a certain magnitude
or threshold level of risk must be demonstrated in a risk
assessment for an SPS measure based thereon to be otherwise
consistent with Article 5.1 of the Agreement.10 5
Quite to the contrary, the Appellate Body specifically rejected
the imposition of a quantitative assessment of risk into the terms
of the SPS Agreement.' 0 6 Rather, a panel will be "authorized only
to determine whether a given SPS measure is "based on" a risk
10 7
assessment."
Additionally, the Appellate Body discussed the scope of what
was permissible to consider while carrying out a risk assessment.
It considered relevant the fact that the listing in Article 5.2 begins
with evaluation of "available scientific evidence": "[A] risk
assessment ...
is a scientific process aimed at establishing the
scientific basis for the sanitary measures a Member intends to
take."' 0 8 However, it did not agree with the Panel as to the
limiting effect of this characterization-that this necessarily
excluded from the scope of a risk assessment matters not capable
of quantitative analysis by empirical methods commonly used in
the physical sciences.' 0 9 Instead, the Appellate Body argued that
several Article 5.2 factors, such as "relevant processes and

101. See Appellate Report, supra note 78, at para. 184. Observe that the
term "probability" was not included in the Agreement's definition of "risk
assessment."
102. Id.

103.

Id.

104. See id. at para. 185 (citing U.S. Panel Report, supra note 20, at Annex,
para. 819).

105.

See id. at para. 186.

106.
See id.
107. Id. See discussion of "based on" in the context of the Agreement, infra
Parts IILD-E.
108. Appellate Report supra note 78, at para. 187 (citing with approval, U.S.
Panel Report, supranote 20, at para. 8.107).
109. See id.
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production methods" and "relevant inspection, sampling and

testing methods" by their very nature were not susceptible of
investigation according to common laboratory methods associated
with the physical sciences. 1 10 Furthermore, they held that the list
of factors under Article 5.2 was not 'intended to be a closed list."
I" In other words, what matters is not only risk ascertainable by
common laboratory methods, but risk tangible in the "real world"
and its "actual potential for adverse effects on human
health in
1 12
the real world where people live and work and die."
Here, as with the Precautionary Principle, the Appellate Body
unfortunately restrained itself from creating any enforceable
boundary to the list of appropriate factors for consideration in a
risk assessment under Article 5.2, instead only further
befuddling the issue with its broad notions of "real world" effect.
Thus, the role of these "unquantifiable real world effects"--most
notably "consumer anxiety"-in the context of the Agreement
remains uncertain.
C. Social Policy and Risk Management Underthe SPS Agreement
Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement sets forth the basic risk
management obligation: "Members shall ensure that any sanitary
or phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on
scientific principles and is not maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence, except as provided in [Article 5.7]. " 13 The
Agreement defines risk assessment as "the evaluation of the
114
potential for adverse effects on human or animal health...."
The Panel held that Article 2.2 informs Article 5.111s which
obliges Members to "ensure that their [SPS] measures are based
on an assessment... of the risks to human, animal or plant life
or health."11 6 Furthermore, the Panel found that "risk
management" and "risk assessment" were thereby two distinct
processes in the context of the Agreement. 1 17
"Risk
Management was a "policy exercise involving social value
judgments made by political bodies," while a "risk assessment"
1 18
was a "scientific examination of data and factual studies."

110.
111.

Id.
Id.

112.

Id.

113.
114.
115.

SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at art. 2.2.
I& at Annex A, para. 4.
See Appellate Report, supranote 78, at para. 193.

116.

Id. at art 5.1.

117.

See U.S. Panel Report, supranote 20, at paras. 8.37-8.38, 8.41.

118.

Id. at para. 8.40.
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More specifically, the Panel held that the risk assessment
obligations under Article 5.2 (relating to "relevant inspection,
sampling and testing methods") do not permit the assessment of
factors such as "control" (ensuring the observance of good
practice) which seem primarily related to the economic or social
incidence related to a substance or its particular use rather than
the risks specific to the substance itself. 119 Therefore, a Member
was not to consider "non-scientific" data in the course of risk
assessment-a risk assessment which the risk management
decision must be based upon. 120
However, the Appellate Body disagreed with this
interpretation. The Appellate Body noted that the "term "risk
management" is not to be found in either Article 5 or in any other
provision of the SPS Agreement." 12 1 Thus, the Appellate Body
refused to accept the Panel's more restrictive notion of "risk
assessment," rather endorsing a more general view of risk
assessment which need not be informed by merely scientific
data. 12 2 The Appellate Body relied directly upon the text of the
Agreement that states that "control, inspection and approval
procedures include, inter alia, procedures for sampling, testing
and certification."1 23 This definition thereby informs Article 5.2
which maintains that in addition to "available scientific evidence,"
a risk assessment should take into account "relevant inspection,
sampling and testing methods."' 2 4 Moreover, the Appellate Body
concluded that the list of relevant factors was not meant to be
125
exhaustive.
The natural implication of these determinations is that a
Member has leeway to consider relevant social policies in addition
to "science" in the assessment of risks. The precise parameters of
what may be considered "relevant social policies" remain unclear.
Furthermore, since Article 5.1 indicates that a Member may

consider Article 5.7 where "insufficient relevant scientific data

exists," 126 the Precautionary Principle, by implication,
conceivably may play a role in "risk management" under the
Agreement. But, once again, the extent to which a Member may
justify its SPS measures by invoking the Principle is an issue left
unresolved by the Appellate Body.

119. Id. at para. 8.92.
120. Id.
121. See Appellate Report, supra note 78, at para. 181.
122. See id.
123. Id. at para. 205 (quoting SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at Annex C
n.7) (emphasis in Appellate Report).
124. Id.
125. See id. at para. 187.
126. SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at arts. 5.1, 5.7.

1999]

THE SPS AGREEMENT
D. When is an SPS Measure "BasedOn"
a Risk Assessment?

Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement states that "Members shall
ensure that their [SPS] measures are based on an assessment, as
appropriate to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal
or plant life or health." 127 The question that immediately begs
resolution is whether "basing" a measure on a risk assessment
implies a minimal procedural requirement.
The Panel held that a party, in defending a measure under
Article 5.2, needs to "submit evidence that at least it actually took
into account a risk assessment when it enacted or maintained its
sanitary measure in order for that measure to be considered as
based on a risk assessment."128 Thus, even where a party
conducts a risk assessment, failure to provide evidence that they
took account of the assessment will condemn the measure for
failure to conform to the obligations of Article 5.2.
However, the Appellate Body rejected the subjectivity
inherent in the "taking into account" standard in favor of a more
objective manner of satisfying the minimal procedural
requirement:1 2 9 "We believe that "based on" is appropriately
taken to refer to a certain objective relationship between two
elements, that is to say, to an objective situation that persists
and is observable between an SPS measure and a risk
assessment."1 3 0 In other words, there is no additional procedural
burden upon a Member defending an SPS measure to show

evidence that they took account of a risk assessment.
the Panel articulated the "substantive
Additionally,
requirements" necessary for an SPS measure to be "based on" a
risk assessment. The Panel identified two distinct inquiries which
comprise this substantive requirement. First, identifying the
scientific conclusions reached in the risk assessment and the
scientific conclusions implicit in the SPS measure; and second,
examining those scientific conclusions to determine whether or
not one set of conclusions matches, i.e., conforms with, the
second set of conclusions. 1 3 ' Thus, the substantive task of the

Id. at art. 5.1 (emphasis added).
127.
128.
U.S. Panel Report, supranote 20, at para. 8.59.
The Appellate Body was concerned that the subjectivity of the "minimal
129.
procedural requirement" suggested by the "taking into account" standard could
potentially lead to the exclusion of available scientific evidence that "rationally
supports the SPS measure being examined." Appellate Report, supra note 78, at
para. 190.
130. Id. at para. 189.
See U.S. Panel Report, supra note 20, at para. 8.63 (discussing
131.
specifically the inquiry to be made about the EC measures concerning the use of
growth hormones in meat).
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Member is to ensure at least some conformity of the scientific
conclusions implicit in the SPS measures to the scientific

conclusions reached in the risk assessments submitted as
justification for the particular measure.
The Appellate Body essentially endorsed the approach of the
Panel in this regard, but in a passage of paramount importance,
the Body indicated that conformity of the scientific conclusions
implicit in the risk assessment and the SPS measure itself does
not alone outweigh the relevance of other policy considerations
implicit in risk management. 13 2 The specific standard adopted by
the Appellate Body is as follows:
We believe that Article 5.1, when contextually read as it should be,
in conjunction with and informed by Article 2.2 of the SPS
Agreement, requires that the results of the risk assessment must

sufficiently warrant-that is to say, reasonably support-the SPS
measure at stake. The requirement that an SPS measure be "based
on" a risk assessment is a substantive requirement that there be a
rational relationship
assessmenL 13 3

between

the

measure

and

the

risk

Such a deferential standard seems to leave great discretion with
the Members to base the SPS measures primarily on nonscientific social or policy choices needing only a rational relation
to the scientific conclusions implicit in the risk assessment
itself-a risk assessment which, as defined by the Appellate Body
itself, may include assessment of non-quantifiable factors not
grounded in the customary physical sciences. l 34 Such a result
seems incongruous with the primary aim of the Agreement in
making science a more relevant consideration in international
regulatory decisionmaking. This holding of the Appellate Body
seemingly leads to the circular result that a Member seeking to
justify an SPS measure need only show that its measure was
rationally related to a risk assessment whose implicit scientific
conclusion need not even be based in "science" as generally
understood-that is to say the quantifiable physical sciences.
Accordingly, "science" is lost in the mix and the SPS measure
may be justified without ever showing a truly "scientific
justification."
Furthermore, the Appellate Body held that Article 5.1 "does
not require that the risk assessment must necessarily embody
only the view of a majority of the relevant scientific
community."1 35 The Appellate Body noted that often there are
divergent views on any particular issue within the relevant

132.
133.
134.
135.

See Appellate Report, supra note 78, at para. 193.
Id. (emphasis added)
See id. at para. 2530)
Id. at para.194.
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scientific

community

which

itself may

indicate

"scientific

uncertainty." 13 6 The opinion recognized that while governments
often tend to base legislative measures and administrative
regulations on the predominant or "mainstream" scientific
opinions, a government may act responsibly and "in good faith"
on the basis of a contradictory opinion from an equally qualified
or respected source.' 3 7 Therefore, the fact that a Member may not
be basing its SPS measure upon mainstream scientific opinion
does not, by itself, signal failure to comply with the substantive
procedural requirements of Article 5.2. The opinion further
suggested that the "reasonable relationship," in this context, is
even more apparent where the risk involved is "life-threatening in
character and is perceived to constitute a clear and imminent
138
threat to public health and safety."

Thus, the opinion of the Appellate Body seems to impart
considerable autonomy to a Member in both objectively and
subjectively "basing" their SPS measures on a risk assessment.
The objective requirement is satisfied by a showing that an
objective situation persists and is identifiable in both the
measure and the risk assessment. The subjective element is
satisfied by showing a rational relationship between the measure
and the risk assessment-a risk assessment which need not
adopt the mainstream scientific opinion on the issue. This creates
an environment where a Member could fabricate a satisfactory
response to these "minimal" procedural requirements which is
merely a pretext for a disguised restriction on international trade,
yet still have "based" their measure on a "risk assessment" in the
context of the Agreement.
E. When is an SPS Measure "BasedOn" an
InternationalStandard?
Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement provides "[tjo harmonize
sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as
possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary
measures
on
international
standards,
guidelines
or
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided

136.

Id. However, the Appellate Body did not indicate the threshold of

uncertainty necessary for a Member to apply for protection under Article 5.7,
which implicitly adopts the Precautionary Principle. This could ultimately become
an important issue which future panels must confront.
137.
Id. This implicitly suggests that there must nonetheless be some sort
of subjective determination of what may be considered "qualified and respected
sources."

138.

Id.
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for in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. "13 9 The
Panel viewed "based on" international standards as equating to
"conforming to" international standards. 140 The Panel found that
considering whether a particular SPS measure is "based on" an
international standard requires an account of the level of sanitary
protection the measure achieves.1 41 This level of sanitary
protection should then be compared to the level of protection
implicit in the international standards, recommendations, or
guidelines.14 2 If a sanitary measure is to be found to be "based
on" the international standard, in conformance with a Member's
obligations under Article 3.1, it must reflect the "same" level of
protection implicit in the international norms. 1 43 Thus, where the

international standard reflects a different level of sanitary
protection, the Member's measure will not be "based on" the
international standard for the purposes of the Agreement. 144
However, the Appellate Body did not accept this
interpretation. As a matter of strict textual interpretation, the
Appellate Body noted that the plain meaning of "based on" is
quite different than the ordinary understanding of "conform
5

to": 14

A thing is commonly said to be "based on" another thing when the
former "stands" or is "founded" or "built" upon or "is supported by"
the latter. In contrast, much more is required before one thing may
be regarded as "conform[ing] to" another: the former must "comply
with", "yield or show compliance" with the latter. The reference of
"conform to" is to "correspondence in form or manner", to
"compliance with" or "acquiescence", to "followling] in form
or
nature". 146

Thus, while conformity with an international standard assures
that the sanitary measure will be "based on" that standard, a
measure may nonetheless be "based on" the international
standard yet not be in "conformity" with every element of the
international standard. 147 As the Appellate Body apparently
reads the Agreement, the international standards are more in the
line of recommendations which a Member need only consider as a
guide rather than adopt or be "based on" as a model.

139.
140.
141.
142.

SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art. 3.1 (emphasis added).
See U.S. Panel Report, supranote 20, at para. 8.18.
See id.
See id.

143.

See id.

144.

See id.

145.

See Appellate Report, supra note 78, at para. 163.

146.

Id. (citing 1 THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DIcIoNARY ON HISTORICAL

PRINCIPLES 187, 477 (L. Brown ed.)).
147.
See id.
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The Appellate Body used the stated "object and purpose of
Article 3" to justify its decision. 148 In particular, the Appellate
Body made reference to Article 3.1 which seeks to "harmonize
[SPS] measures on as wide a basis as possible... ," and to the
preamble of the Agreement which seeks to "further the use of
harmonized [SPS] measures between Members on the basis of
internationalstandards.. . ."149 The Appellate Body read this
language as indicating a clear acknowledgment that complete
harmonization is a "goal," not a mandate.' 5 0 In other words, the
Agreement is merely encouraging harmonization rather than
requiring conformity. The Appellate Body did not want to
transform the international standards into binding norms without
more specific and clear textual indication than that currently
found in the Agreement.' 5 ' Such a transformation, they argued,
would unfairly encroach upon the sovereignty of the Member
States.' S2 Thus, "based on" cannot mean "conform to" as the SPS
Agreement is currently drafted and accepted.
However, the impact of this holding may be of little
consequence when viewed in light of the Appellate Body's
characterization of Article 3.3. Article 3.3 holds: "Members may
introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which
result in a higher level of [SPS] protection than would be achieved
by measures based on the relevant international standards ... if
there is a scientific justification."' 5 3 Thus, a Member may adopt a
level of sanitary protection not "based on" the international
standards, and indeed, set for itself a higher level of protection.
The Appellate Body confirmed that this is "an autonomous right
and not an "exception" from a "general obligation" under Article
3.1 ."154

Accordingly, it is difficult to impart any true substance or
"teeth" to the obligations under Article 3.1. The fact that a
Member may justify a departure from the international standards

148.
149.

Id. at para. 165.
Id. (quoting SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at art 3.1, pmbl.) (emphasis

added).

150.
151.

See id.
Id

152.

See id. For an in-depth look at interpretive principles in international

law specifically addressing the recognition of state sovereignty, see 1 OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1278 (R. Jennings and A. Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992) (noting that
the "principle of in dubio mitius applies in interpreting treaties, in deference to the
sovereignty of states. If the meaning of a term is ambiguous, that meaning is to be
preferred which is less onerous to the party assuming an obligation, or which
interferes less with the territorial and personal supremacy of a party, or involves
less general restrictions upon the parties.")
153.
SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at art. 3.3.
154.
Appellate Report, supranote 78, at para. 172.
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and norms under Article 3.3 renders impotent any substantive
requirement under Article 3.1 that Members "base" their sanitary
measures on international guidelines. Whereas Article 3.1 alone
could potentially eliminate a wide range of discriminatory trade
regulations by requiring at least some conformity with
international norms, Article 3.3 allows a Member an autonomous
right to opt out of its Article 3.1 obligations. Once again, a great
deal of discretion is left with the Members in their risk
management affairs.
Furthermore, it is unclear how this right to choose
compliments the underlying goal of harmonizing Members" SPS
measures with international standards-a goal Article 3 was
designed to address in the first place. The Appellate Body argues
that the requirement for "sufficient scientific evidence" for
measures adopted under Article 2.2, and a resulting Article 5.1
"risk assessment" will prevent Members from abusing their
discretion under Article 3.3.155 However, as noted above, the "risk
assessment" need not endorse or represent a "mainstream
scientific opinion," the "scientific justification" need not be based
in the ordinary "empirical" sciences, and the measures taken
need only be "rationally related" to the findings in the risk
assessment.156 This loose and ambiguous framework, established
by the Appellate Body, can hardly serve as an effective restraint
on a Member's discretion. Instead, it may operate to empower a
Member to circumvent the policy of the Agreement and put direct
restraints on international trade which are neither "necessary to
scientifically
protect human, animal or plant life or health"1 5or
7
justifiable under prevailing international opinion.

IV. THE EU'S BAN ON "SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS"

The EU's ban on Specified Risk Materials (SRMs) is likely
justifiable under the SPS Agreement as interpreted by the

155.
See id. at para. 177.
156. See discussion supra Parts III.B-D.
157. SPS Agreement, supranote 32, pmbl. In other words, it would not be a
difficult task, within this framework, for a Member to come up with a "pretextual"
justification for what may actually be a "disguised restriction on international
trade" - thus, undermining a primary goal of the Agreement. See id. Though this
would unlikely be for selfish economic gains, it would nonetheless needlessly
restrict international trade. This has already been noted by the EU farm ministers
when they once again extended the implementation date of the ban another year
(until January 1, 2000). See EU Delays Animal PartsBan, supranote 2.
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Appellate Body.158 However, this result would be incongruous
with the stated policy of the Agreement because the ban is likely
motivated by political pressures, is not based on mainstream
scientific views, and issued largely in response to "consumer
anxiety" rather than scientific certainty.
As discussed in Part III.A above, the role of the Precautionary
Principle in the context of the Agreement is still ambiguous.' 5 9
Nonetheless, the dicta of the Appellate Body's opinion suggested
an implicit approval of the Precautionary Principle in Article
5.716 0-though the specific role of the Principle or weight given to
such an approach was left for determination on another occasion.
Furthermore, and perhaps suggestive of endorsement of a
precautionary "approach" at the least, the Appellate Body noted
that a panel presiding over an SPS dispute should consider that
governments are frequently overcautious where potentially
irreversible risks to human health or life are concerned. 16 1 Thus,
in the context of the Mad Cow scare and the proposed ban on
SRMs, 16 2 the EU may arguably look to the Precautionary
Principle to justify its SPS measure. This conclusion is more
likely in this instance than in the context of the Hormones
Dispute, where the potentially irreversible risks to human health
and life are more conclusively documented. 163 At the very least,
apart from any ruling on Article 5.7, a presiding panel 1 64 may

well consider such risks to life or health when addressing the
means of risk management inherent in the SPS measure, or the
proposed ban on SRMs in this instance1 6 5 In other words, a
panel may have the authority to be more permissive as to
restrictive trade measures where identifiable and harmful
contaminants are at issue.
This case is also distinguishable from the Hormones Dispute
in other aspects. Here, the EU has carried out risk assessments

158.
For a recap of the proposed SRM ban and its implications for the U.S.
pharmaceuticals industry, see discussion supra Part I.
See also, e.g., Buckley,
Talks on BSE, supranote 4, at 8.
159.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
160.
See Appellate Report, supra note 78, at para. 124 (noting that Article
5.7 embodies the Precautionary Principle).
161.
See id.
162.
See discussion supraPart I.
163.
In the Hormones Dispute, the very safety of the banned materials was
at issue, whereas here it is generally conceded that BSE does pose a serious
threat to human health or life. Indeed, scientists have found a link between BSE
and the human version of mad cow's disease (Creutzfield-Jakob disease) which is
an incurable degenerative brain disease in humans. See Parker-Pope & Wolf,
supra note 26, at A14.
164.
The panel would be convened if the United States brought a formal
complaint to the WTO.
165.
See Appellate Report, supranote 78, at para. 124.
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finding a specific link between eating contaminated beef products
16 6
and contracting the life threatening Cruetzfield-Jakob disease.
Thus, while the Appellate Body found that the EU did not perform
a risk assessment in the Hormones Dispute, it would likely find
the opposite in the SRM dispute. Because this primary obligation
under the SPS Agreement has been met, the panel would then be
free1 6 7 to determine whether the proposed ban is "based on" the
68
risk assessment[s].1
However, as noted above, this is not an arduous task. Indeed
the standard set by the Appellate Body only requires a 'rational
relationship" between the proposed SPS measure and the risk
assessment. 169 Furthermore, the views expressed in the EU's risk
assessment need not even convey mainstream scientific
opinion. 170 Thus, even if the United States-or any other
interested party-had a different 'scientific" opinion, the
Appellate Body nonetheless indicated tacit approval of such an
assessment as justification for the proposed ban. While it is
unclear exactly how a future panel will interpret the "rational
relationship," the Appellate opinion certainly suggests a high
degree of deference to a Member's discretion and a low level of
scrutiny to be applied by the panel in its resolutions. Here, a
blanket ban on potential sources of BSE or SRMs would clearly
have a rational relation to the goal of protecting consumers from
the potential health risks of the SRMs.
The proposed ban is also supported by the Appellate Body's
broad notions of science. Specifically pertinent are those
scientifically unquantifiable risks and the real world effects of the
risk-contrasted with the risks in a vacuum. The breadth of these
unquantifiable real world risks was left undetermined, but given
the Appellate Body's acknowledgment (and endorsement) of
political autonomy, and the pervasive influence of social policies
in risk management decisions, it is likely that consumer anxiety
or political influence could be a legitimate, or even primary,
justification for the ban-a ban which is only tangentially, or
rationally, related to the underlying science and actual risk the
SRMs pose. The problem this presents is that the ban is so
excessive in its scope 1 7 ' when considering the actual risk posed,

166.
See Parker-Pope & Wolf, supranote 26, at A14.
167. This was not the case in the once Hormones Dispute, where the Panel
abstained from looking further once the EU failed in its primary obligation. See
supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
168.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
169.
See Appellate Report, supranote 78, at para. 193.
170.
See id. at para. 194.
171.
The justification for such a broad scope is to eliminate fears of a nonuniform or discriminate ban.
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and that the ban itself has only a tenuous, albeit rational,
relationship to the risk assessment-a risk assessment which
may permissibly be biased towards a non-conventional scientific
view.
Though the SPS Agreement purports to prevent Members
from enacting measures "more trade-restrictive than required to
achieve their appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary
protection, 1 7 2 the leniency afforded Members in choosing their
level of sanitary protection coupled with the rational relationship
test explained above have the paradoxical effect of letting a
Member dictate to the world what is justifiable under the
Agreement rather than having the Agreement dictate what is
permissible to the Member. This result is contrary to the purpose

of the Agreement-establishing more adherence to international
norms and eliminating trade restrictions which are unjustifiable
and unnecessary.
Further, while the SPS Agreement speaks broadly of
eliminating "disguised restriction[s] on international trade,"1 7 3 it
is unclear what these restrictions constitute. Is there an
"improper motive" requirement? Presumably, the Agreement
speaks largely to Members" concerns about protectionist or
arbitrary measures which adversely effect international trade, but
whether it speaks to more benign restrictions which arise to ease
consumer anxiety or to preserve political power or confidence is
uncertain. Indeed, the proposed SRM ban is likely a direct result
of the latter. While there may be no ill motive in this situation,
restrictions which arise from political and social pressures
nonetheless can have an adverse impact on international trade
and should be expressly condemned under the Agreement.
Indeed, this leads back to the original thesis of this Note: Placing
restrictions on the global market is not the proper means for
regaining "consumer confidence" in what is largely an intrastate
1 74
issue.
The proposed ban seems to be the result of political
pressures and attempts to address consumer anxieties in the
175
wake of the Mad Cow scare rather than actual scientific risks.

172. SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at art. 5.6.
173. Id. at pmbl.
174. See discussion supraPart I.
175. There is well-documented evidence that the ban will severely hurt the
British economy as well, thus eliminating any concerns of protectionism or illmotive. In fact, opposition to the ban has come from tallow producers within the
EU as well. See, e.g., Industry Sees Minimal BSE Risk, Dow Jones Intel. News, Sept.

8, 1997, available in WESTLAW, DJINPLUS Database. Indeed, it was likely that
the effect on the United States pharmaceuticals industry was not contemplated at
the time of the ban. See Mad Cow Disease: Massive Beef Export Fraud Uncovered,
EUR. REP., Sept. 3, 1997, availablein 1997 WL 13046321.
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It is well-documented that the purpose of the blanket ban on
British Beef exports was to address consumer confidence in
British Beef and the Beef market in general.1 7 6 Indeed, the
Labour Party disparaged Tory ministers for having a "reckless
disregard for public health" by not initially including beef
derivatives (tallow and gelatin) in the ban, and also encouraged
the government to17 7"reassure the public by going further than the
scientific advice."
Evidence indicates that hesitancy by the European
Commission and political indecisiveness during the initial phases
of the Mad Cow Scare led to the more decisive and overreaching
action in the current proposal. The plans for the proposed ban
were initially rejected by the European Commission, 178 but were
revived when threats of censure arose amid accusations of
"mishandling" the Mad Cow crisis and when the Commission
narrowly escaped removal and a vote of no confidence in
February of 1997 by the Parliament. 17 9 Arguably, the proposed
ban arose more from concerns of political censure and reassuring
consumer confidence than from legitimate concerns for public
health or actual scientific risks posed from the banned importsespecially those from countries where there has been no
documented outbreak of Mad Cow disease. Because Mad Cow
disease is largely an intrastate issue, at least within the EU, the
import ban is not justifiable on grounds of regaining consumer
confidence. Nonetheless, the ban is likely permissible as the
Appellate Body interpreted the SPS Agreement.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement reads: "To harmonize
sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as
possible, Members shall base their sanitary and phytosanitary
or
guidelines
standards,
international
on
measures
recommendations ... ."1o However, the Appellate Body read this
provision too narrowly, ultimately undermining the very goal of

176.

See Parker-Pope & Wolf, supranote 26, at A14.

177.

Patrick Wintour, Ministers Defy Beef Outcry Children Under 'No Greater

Threat", GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 26, 1996, at 1, availablein 1996 WL 4016818.
178.

See Mike Smith, Offal at the Heartof the Dispute, FIN. TIMES (London),

Oct. 16, 1997, at 4, availablein 1997 WL 14786576.

179. See Mad Cow Disease: EP Committee Dissatisfied Over Disciplinary
Issues, EUR. REP., Oct. 15, 1997, available in 1997 WL 13047256. Several officials
in the Commission's Directorate-General VI (Agriculture and Rural Development)
were singled out for mishandling the crisis and disciplinary action was called for
from several sources within the Commission. See id.
SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at art 3.1.
180.
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harmonization that Article 3 was designed to address.
Harmonization on as wide a basis as possible should mean that
conformity should be the rule, not the exception as the Appellate
Body seemed to reason. In other words, a Member should have
to more than merely consider the international recommendations,
a Member should be required to adhere to the norm unless
extenuating circumstances demand an exception.18 ' The
Appellate Body got tangled in strict textualism and refused to
read "conformity" into a statute which only stated "based on," but
such an interpretation ignores a basic tenet of purposivismevery statute is enacted for a purpose.' 8 2 Here, the stated
purpose of Article 3 was harmonization with international
standards. If a Member need only refer to international norms as
guidelines, the Member will have little incentive to harmonize its
SPS measure to the international recommendations where doing
so does not serve its particular agenda. The Appellate Body noted

that harmonization is a goal, not a mandate, but the goal will
likely never be achieved unless conformity is the rule, not the
exception. 183
Furthermore, a Member's Article 3.3 right to set its own level
of SPS protection-specifically higher than that suggested by the
international norms-should not be an "autonomous" right as
suggested by the Appellate Body. 18 4 Rather, this right to set a
higher level of SPS protection should be an exception from a
general obligation of conformity under Article 3.1. The exception
would apply in those circumstances where: (1) the science is
unclear and, (2) the magnitude of the risk is great-both
economically and in terms of human health or life. This would
ensure that the costs of the SPS measure, which departs from the
its
benefits, while
exceed
never
international norms,
simultaneously balancing the need to defer to caution where the
science is unclear. However, where there is a general consensus
regarding the underlying science, Article 3.1 should be the rule.
This reading not only better serves the need for harmonization of
standards for international trade, but also does not render Article
3.1 an apparent nullity with no real "teeth" as is the case with the
Appellate Body interpretation. If a Member can justify a departure
from international norms, and this would serve the Member's

181.
An example of an extenuating circumstance is the absence of an
international norm or recommendation at the time the measure is being proposed.
182.
Indeed, the title itself, "Harmonization," offers textualist support for a
theory that harmonization should be the rule, not the exception.
183.
This is likely so because the self-interest of the Member at some point
will outweigh the needs of the greater community where discretion is given to the

Member to conform or not conform.
184.

See Appellate Report, supranote 78, at para. 172.
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why would the Member choose to bind itself
interest, 18
nonetheless to the international standard? Reading conformity as
the rule in Article 3.1 would effectively provide this incentive.
Furthermore, Article 5.7 should be dropped completely.
Article 5.7 implicitly embodies the Precautionary Principle and
allows a Member to adopt a precautionary approach where
scientific evidence is insufficient with regard to the actual risks
the SPS measure seeks to eliminate. The incorporation of Article
5.7 only hopelessly and needlessly confuses a uniform
interpretation of the SPS Agreement. If the Precautionary
Principle ever becomes a universally accepted principle of
international law then it will necessarily be incorporated into
Articles 5.1 and 5.2, which direct Members to consider risk
assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations and relevant scientific processes.18 6 Otherwise, the
Precautionary Principle is being "force" upon the Members not all
who may on its relevance and its proper role in the context of the
Agreement.187 The inequitable result would be even more
apparent where the scientific risks are truly uncertain, yet the
probable magnitude of the risk is low. In such an instance,

largely on the basis of "insufficient" science, a Member could
adopt a precautionary approach and upset international trade
even where the potential magnitude of the risk is low. Rather, a
cost/benefit paradigm, as in the suggested application of Articles
3.1 and 3.3 above, would be a more efficient manner of risk
management where the relevant science is uncertain.
Finally, the Article 5.1 requirement that the SPS measure
must be "based on" a scientific risk assessment should require
more than a rational relation.' 8 8 Requiring a mere rational
relation subverts the goal of making science a more prevalent
factor in international trade regulation by giving Members too
much discretion to base their risk management decisions
primarily on non-scientific, political, or social factors. The
rational relationship test requires only a tangential relationship
between the SPS measure and the underlying science. At least an
intermediate level of scrutiny should be applied, and the

185. Self-interest could mean politicalas suggested by the instant case.
186. See SPS Agreement, supra note 32, at arts. 5.1-5.2.
187. For example, the United States argued in the Hormone's Dispute that
the Precautionary Principle was not yet an international norm. See generally U.S.
Panel Report, supra note 20, at para. 8.23. While each Member clearly ratified
the Agreement, including Article 5.7, the wording of 5.7 was sufficiently
ambiguous as to the extent it actually embodied the Precautionary Principle
per se. However, The Appellate Body laid uncertainty to rest when it announced
that Article 5.7 did reflect the Precautionary Principle. See Appellate Report, supra
note 78, at para. 124.

188.

See SPS Agreement, supranote 32, at art. 5.1.
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relationship should be substantial rather than rational. This
approach would appropriately balance the discretionary needs of
public policy makers with the rights of the effected Members not
to have their trade disrupted by primarily internal or intrastate
political agendas of sister States. It is important to recognize that
effective regulation of international trade requires consideration
of non-scientific factors, such as politics and economics, but at
the same time coordination of international trade among the
many nations of the world requires some level of uniformity in
application.18 9 Though subject to slight variation, science is a
norm which could set uniform standards for trade regulations for

public health and welfare because science is precisely what
identifies risks to human life or health at the outset. The SPS
Agreement was intended to be a step in that direction. Therefore,
the SPS Agreement should be interpreted by the WTO as
encouraging the adoption of science as an international
regulatory norm. Unfortunately, the rational relationship test falls
short of that mark. In light of this shortcoming, Members likely
have the discretion to enact SPS measures largely to ease
consumer anxiety. 1 90 Such results are both contrary to the
purpose of enacting the SPS Agreement and to the elimination of
regulations which are neither necessary for the protection of
human health nor justified by science.
Ryan David Thomas*

189. Uniformity is important to prevent arbitrary, retaliatory or capricious
trade wars, sanctions, etc.
190. Members also like such discretion to save their political careers, as in
the EU's proposed import ban. See supranote 178 and accompanying text.
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Vanderbilt University; B.A., Trinity College.
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